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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH. 
PlaintifFAppellee, Case No. 920747-CA 
vs. 
THOMAS WESLEY CALLAHAN, Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2a-
3(2)(f) which grants original appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals in criminal 
cases except for those cases involving capital and first degree felonies. The defendant, 
Mr. Thomas Wesley Callahan, hereinafter referred to as the defendant, was convicted of a 
Third Degree Felony, Aggravated Assault, a violation of Utah Code Annotated Section 
76-5-103, on or about October 19, 1992. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Was Defendant's trial counsel ineffective because he failed to investigate and 
interview prospective defense witnesses? 
2. Was Defendant's trial counsel ineffective because he failed to subpoena defense 
witnesses to testify at trial to corroborate portions of the Defendant's testimony? 
3. Was Defendant's trial counsel ineffective because he failed to make a motion 
for a new trial so that affidavits from Defendant's witnesses could be submitted in support 
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of that motion? 
4. Was Defendant's trial counsel ineffective because he failed to object when the 
prosecuting attorney asked defendant on cross examination about the specific felony of 
which he had been previously convicted and/or for not making a motion in limine to 
prevent such an inquiry in the first place? 
5. Was the introduction of the evidence of Defendant's prior conviction improper 
in that no prior determination had been made by the Court that probative value of that 
evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect? 
6. Was it prosecutorial misconduct for the prosecuting attorney to introduce 
evidence of the fact of and the specific prior conviction of Appellant justifying a reversal 
and new trial in this case? 
7. Was the evidence presented at trial sufficient to support the verdict? 
The first four issues, which can be addressed together since they are merely 
subparts of the larger question of ineffectiveness of counsel, present a mixed question of 
law and fact. Strickland v. Washington 466 U.S. 668, 698, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2070 (1984). 
This was recognized by the Supreme Court of Utah in State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182,186 
(Utah 1990). Where no claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was presented to the 
trial court, an appellate court may review the record to determine on appeal whether 
counsel's performance constituted ineffective assistance as a matter of law. State v. 
Johnson 176 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 18-19. 
The next two issues raised regarding the admission of the specific crime of which 
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defendant had previously been convicted is addressed under a standard of "harmless 
error", or in other words, without the error was there a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable result. Rule 30, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 77-35-30 Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, As amended, State V. Fontana 680 P. 2d 1042, 1048 (1984), State v. 
Banner 717 P. 2d 1325 (1986). 
Finally, the issue regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict is 
judged under a standard of reviewing the evidence, along with the reasonable inferences 
from it, in the light most favorable to the verdict and reversing only if that evidence and 
the inferences therefrom are so inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime 
of which he was convicted. State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, RULES, ECT. 
1. Sixth Amendment, United States Constitution; Constitution of Utah, Article 
I, Section 12. 
AMENDMENT VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defence. 
ART. I, SECTION 12 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have 
the right to appear and defend in person and by 
counsel... 
2. Rule 609, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking 
credibility of a witness, evidence that he has 
been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if 
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elicited from him or established by public record 
during cross-examination but only if the crime 
(1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in 
excess of one year under the law under which he 
was convicted, and the court determines that the 
probative value of admitting this evidence out-
weighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, 
or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, 
regardless of the punishment. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Thomas Wesley Callahan, was charged, by amended information, with 
one count of Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated Section 76-5-103. At the close of the State's case, no motion to dismiss was 
made. The prosecution called several witnesses, including the alleged victim, the treating 
physician, the investigating officer from the Pleasant Grove police department, and several 
private parties who witnessed parts of the altercation which led to the charges. The 
defendant was the only witness called by the defense. No other witnesses were 
interviewed or subpoenaed by the defense because none of the potential witnesses given 
by the defendant to his attorney were interviewed by counsel. Nor did defense counsel 
secure any medical evidence regarding injuries sustained by defendant in this altercation 
which could have corroborated defendants assertions that he acted in self defense. 
At the close of her cross examination of defendant, the prosecuting attorney asked 
defendant if he had ever been convicted of a felony. The final question which was asked 
was what felony defendant had previously been convicted of. Defendant's answer was 
that he had previously been convicted of Aggravated Assault, (the same charge that he 
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was presently standing trial for) No objections were made to these questions by defense 
counsel Nor had he filed a motion in limine to prevent such questioning prior to the start 
of or at any time during the trial of this case The conviction about which Appellant was 
questioned was six years old at the time of this trial and this fact was known by the 
prosecuting attorney Furthermore, defense counsel did not question the investigating 
officer about some pencils and a pen which defendant had told counsel were in 
defendant's shirt pocket when he was assaulted by the alleged victim in this case and 
which were broken or bent and knocked out of the defendant's pocket during the course 
of that assault 
Defendant was convicted of the offense charged by the jury Defense counsel did 
not move for a Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or for a New Trial Thereafter on 
October 19, 1992, Appellant was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate 
term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison A timely Notice of Appeal was 
filed and was followed by several Enlargements of Time to file this brief 
FACTS 
On or about August 4, 1992, Appellant was an employee of one Carl Murdock at 
Murdock's auto body and repair shop in Lindon, Utah Appellant had been so employed 
for a short period of time Apparently the employer and employee were having some 
disagreements over some matters related to the employment relationship and Mr Murdock 
terminated Appellants employment After advising the appellant that he was terminating 
his employment, Mr Murdock asked the Appellant to return a key or keys to him (R 52-
5 
53) Mr. Murdock had allowed the Appellant to stay in a camper that was stored on the 
business premises and had allowed him to use one or more vehicles to run personal and 
business errands. (R. 52, 123) A disagreement ensued between Mr. Murdock and the 
Appellant over how much the Appellant was owed and over the return of a key or keys 
from Appellant to Mr. Murdock. Mr. Murdock left the office where Appellant was sitting 
and went into the shop area and asked the alleged victim, Steve Dickerson to come and 
be with him because he anticipated problems with the Appellant. (R. 56, 72) The alleged 
victim, Mr. Murdock is a young man, 24 years of age, who is six feet, two inches tall and 
weighed between two hundred and twenty-five and two hundred and thirty pounds at the 
time of this incident. (R. 89) In contrast, the Appellant is five feet, eleven inches tall 
and weighed between one hundred and seventy-five and one hundred and eighty pounds 
at the time. Mr. Murdock and Mr. Dickerson confronted the Appellant in the office and 
again the keys were demanded. Appellant again stated that he didn't have the keys. (R. 
55,72-73, 130-131) From that point or* there is some diversity in the testimony as to who 
said what as the disagreement continued. Several points appear to not be in dispute. 
Appellant left the office and went into the shop area. He was followed by Murdock and 
Dickerson who apparently had his only means of leaving the shop more or less blocked 
off. He picked up an iron bar approximately 12 inches long and one inch in diameter and 
moved past Mr. Murdock and Mr. Dickerson to the outside of the shop and in the 
direction of the camper that he lived in. Again he was pursued closely by Murdock and 
Dickerson who continued to insist that he give a key or keys to Mr. Murdock. At some 
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point outside the shop, the Appellant stopped next to a barrel and emptied the contents of 
his pockets to demonstrate that he didn't have the keys they were demanding. No keys 
were found in the contents of his pockets which were emptied on the barrel. (R. 56-60, 
73-79, 134-135) Murdock left to go back inside to call the police. At this point in time 
there is some divergence in the testimony as to what happened and who said what. What 
appears to be clear is that the alleged victim was standing close enough to touch the 
Appellant. (R. 79) When Mr. Murdock turned and walked away, Mr. Dickerson 
interjected himself into the argument, ran up to the Appellant quite aggressively and the 
Appellant hit Dickerson with the metal bar. (R. 104-108) The Appellant was subdued by 
the other persons who were present, including initially Mr. Murdock. Shortly thereafter 
the police arrived and took the Appellant into custody. 
Appellant supplied his trial counsel with the identities or whereabouts of witnesses 
whom he asserts could have corroborated parts of his testimony, particularly about injuries 
he sustained both before and during the incident. Trial counsel did not interview these 
witnesses and consequently none of them were subpoenaed to testify at trial. 
Furthermore, trial counsel did not introduce the pen and/or pencils which appellant stated 
were bent or broken during the assault upon him by Mr. Dickerson. Trial counsel failed 
to object to the introduction of the specifics about or even the fact of Appellants previous 
conviction, even though that conviction was over six years old at the time of this incident. 
(R. 165) Trial counsel did not make a motion in limine to prevent such questioning. 
Trial counsel did not make a motion for a mistrial based upon the introduction of that 
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evidence and did not make a motion for a new trial after the verdict and judgment were 
entered. Trial counsel failed to object to a number of questions posed by the prosecutor 
which were objectionable or move to strike testimony resulting therefrom which was 
improper. 
ARGUMENT 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellants trial counsel failed to investigate and to adequately prepare and present 
the self defense portion of the Appellants case. He also failed to object to the 
introduction of highly prejudicial evidence with little probative value regarding this case 
or to move to strike the same after its admission. The failure to investigate or to 
interview potential witnesses cannot be deemed to be a matter merely of trial tactics 
because one cannot determine whether the testimony of a witness is helpful if they do not 
know what that testimony is. 
The failure to make any attempt to prevent such highly prejudicial testimony as 
was introduced in this case of the Appellants prior conviction of a felony assault charge, 
or to even attempt to remedy that error once the evidence was solicited by the prosecutor, 
cannot be deemed anything but ineffective. The introduction of such testimony could not 
have served any legitimate defense objective. 
The posing of the questions regarding the Appellant's prior conviction by the 
prosecutor was prosecutorial misconduct. The prosecutor knew of the prior conviction, its 
specific nature, and the time frame it involved. Yet she did not notify the court or 
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defense counsel of her intent to ask the questions relative thereto in advance or make a 
motion in limine regarding those questions. The nature of that offense and the time since 
it occurred rendered it of little probative value in this case. Its only possible value was to 
inflame the jury and make them think the defendant was a generally violent and bad 
person. 
The evidence was not sufficient to sustain the verdict. The evidence showed that it 
was Mr. Murdock and Mr. Dickerson who commenced and pursued this argument, even 
in the face of Appellants withdrawal and retreat. Mr. Dickerson provoked the attack 
when he charged toward the Appellant in an aggressive manner. Appellant, being a much 
smaller and an older man was justified in defending himself with whatever means were at 
his disposal in view of the apparent size and strength difference. 
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT 
I 
TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE 
Appellant contends that his trial counsel was ineffective in a number of particulars. 
The most striking of these and the most difficult to measure the effect of was counsels 
failure to investigate the facts of this case and to interview the prospective witnesses 
whom Appellant identified for him. Not one of these witnesses was interviewed by 
counsel to Appellants knowledge. As a consequence of that, counsel could not and did 
not subpoena any of those witnesses at the trial in this case. The Supreme Court of Utah 
has followed the United States Supreme Courts decision in Strickland v. Washington 466 
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U.S.668. State v. Bullock 791 P.2d 155, 160 (Utah 1989); State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 
893 (Utah 1989); State v. Verde, 770 P.2d at 118-20 & n. 2, 124 & n.15; State v. 
Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990). Strickland established and the Utah Supreme Court 
adopted a two pronged test in addressing appeals based upon claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. That test is set forth in Strickland as follows: 
"First, the defendant must show that counsel's 
performance was deficient. This requires showing 
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was 
not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the 
defendant must show that the deficient performance 
prejudiced the defense. This requires showing 
that counsel's errors were so serious as to 
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial 
whose result is reliable. Strickland v. Wash-
ington, 466 U.S. supra at 687. 
In cases where the alleged ineffectiveness of counsel involves a failure to 
investigate the underlying facts of a case, including the availability of prospective defense 
witnesses, the Utah Supreme Court held in State v. Templin, 805 P.2d supra at : 
"If counsel does not adequately investigate 
the underlying facts of a case, including the 
availability of prospective defense witnesses, 
counsel's performance cannot fall within the 
"wide range of reasonable professional assistance." 
This is because a tactical decision not to 
investigate cannot be considered a tactical 
decision. It is only after an adequate inquiry 
has been made that counsel can make a reasonable 
decision to call or not to call particular 
witnesses for tactical reasons." 
The Court held in that case that because counsel did not make a reasonable investigation 
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into the possibility of procuring defense witnesses that the first part of the Strickland test 
had been met. It is submitted to the Court that since defense counsel in this case did not 
do any investigation into the availability of potential defense witnesses, including his 
failure to contact the potential witnesses whose identities or locations were provided to 
him by Appellant, that the first prong of the Strickland test has been met in this case. 
With respect to the second prong of the Strickland test, i.e. showing that the 
deficient performance prejudiced the defense, Appellant asserts that the failures on the 
first prong of necessity run over to the second. That prong requires that the 
defendant/appellant show "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. supra at 694; See also State V. Verde 770 P.2d at 118-
19 n.2, 124 n. 15. Furthermore, "in making this determination, an appellate court should 
consider the totality of the evidence, taking into account such factors as whether the errors 
affect the entire evidentiary picture or have an isolated effect and how strongly the verdict 
is supported by the record." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. supra at 696; State v. 
Templin 805 P.2d supra at . If counsel has failed to contact and interview prospective 
witnesses how can his conduct of the defense be adequate. This is particularly so in a 
case such as this where the only witness called by the defense was the Appellant himself. 
In such a case, any evidence which can corroborate the testimony of the defendant is 
critical since his credibility is crucial to his success. In this case all of the prosecution 
11 
witnesses, other than the investigating officer and the treating physician, were either 
related to or employed by another prosecution witness. In other words, the defendant had 
no friendly witnesses other than himself Even the slightest amount of corroboration from 
the other witnesses who were identified by defendant for his counsel may have been 
sufficient to secure for him the benefit of the doubt in the minds of the jurors. This 
failure on the part of defense counsel was compounded by his failure to object to or to 
make a motion in limine to prevent the prosecution from introducing the evidence elicited 
on cross-examination regarding defendants prior conviction of a felony aggravated assault 
charge. Furthermore, the direct examination of Appellant demonstrates a clear lack of 
preparation of Appellant for his testimony. Rather than prepare Appellant for his 
testimony and conduct it in a controlled question and answer method, counsel allowed 
Appellant to ramble on in an uncontrolled manner which arguably had the effect of 
compromising his credibility. Counsel did not spend adequate time preparing the 
examination of Appellant or preparing Appellant for that examination. In State v. 
Crestani, 771 P.2d 1085 (Utah App. 1989) this Court addressed the second prong of the 
Strickland test in a case in which counsel had failed to investigate, interview and 
subpoena witnesses, and to prepare his client and his wife adequately for their trial 
testimony. In reversing and remanding for a new trial the Court noted that "Certainly, 
there can be no appropriate performance without preparation, and without preparation, 
representation is nothing but a sham and a pretense. As sated in Stnckland,(cite omitted) 
"the benchmark forjudging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's 
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conduct so undermined the functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be 
relied on having produced a just result." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 686; State 
V. Crestani, 111 P.2d supra at . 
II 
THE INTRODUCTION OF DEFENDANTS PRIOR 
FELONY CONVICTION OF AN ASSAULT 
CHARGE WAS ERRONEOUS AND PREJUDICIAL 
AND CONSTITUTED PROSECUTORIAL 
MISCONDUCT 
At the conclusion of her cross-examination of Appellant, the prosecuting attorney 
asked him if he had ever been convicted of a felony. Defense Counsel failed to object to 
this question. Appellant therefore answered that he had. She next asked the specific 
nature of the conviction. Again defense counsel failed to object and Appellant was 
obliged to answer that he had been convicted of Aggravated Assault. The Court had not 
previously made a determination that the probative value of any such evidence 
outweighed its prejudicial effect to the defendant. Appellant asserts that given the nature 
of the charges in this case, the nature of the charges involved in the pnor case, and/or the 
nature of the way the evidence in this case came out coupled with his counsels lack of 
investigation and presentation of potential defense witnesses, and the length of time 
between the prior conviction and the trial in this case, that it was prejudicial error for that 
evidence to be admitted. Regarding such evidence, Rule 609, Utah Rules of Evidence 
provides in pertinent part: 
(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking 
the credibility of a witness, evidence that he 
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has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted 
if elicited from him or established by public 
record during cross-examination but only if the 
crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment 
in excess of one year under the law under which 
he was convicted, and the court determines that 
the probative value of admitting this evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, 
or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, 
regardless of the punishment. 
The Supreme Court of Utah addressed the use of prior convictions for 
impeachment purposes in State v. Banner, 1X1 P.2d 1325. The Court went through a 
lengthy analysis of the rule and its application in the Federal Courts and other state courts 
and said: 
"It is universally held that the prosecution 
has the burden of persuading the court that the 
probative value of admitting the convictions, 
as far as shedding light on the defendant's 
credibility, outweighs the prejudicial effect 
to the defendant....The crime of assault with 
to commit rape does not inherently reflect on 
the defendants character for truth and veracity. 
Instead, it sheds about the same light as any 
felony involving moral turpitude." State v. Banner 
1X1 P.2d supra at 
The Court also addressed the factors to be considered when balancing probative value 
against prejudicial effect. Those factors are: 
" 1. The nature of the crime, as bearing on the 
character for veracity of the witness. 
2. The recentness or remoteness of the prior 
conviction. 
3. The similarity of the prior crime to the 
charged crime, insofar as a close resemblance 
may lead the jury to punish the accused as a 
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bad person. 
4. The importance of credibility in determining 
the truth in a prosecution tried without decisive 
nontestimomal evidence.... 
5. The importance of the accused's testimony, as 
perhaps warranting the exclusion of convictions 
probative of the accused's character for veracity." 
State v. Banner, 111 P.2d supra at 
A review of these factors leads to the conclusion that the evidence of defendants prior 
conviction should not have been received. The prior conviction for an a felony assault 
charge does not fall within the ambit of dishonesty or false statement, and therefore its 
admission can only be justified, if at all under subsection (a)(1) of rule 609. See State v. 
Bruce 779 P.2d 646 (Utah 1989). Since the prior conviction did not involve an offense 
which has any bearing upon the Appellants veracity we can next look at the issue of its 
remoteness in time from the offense charged in the present case. That conviction was 
over six years old at the time of the trial of this case. In State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032 
(Utah 1987) the Supreme Court of Utah noted that the passage of five years since the 
conviction and its complete lack of connection with the defendant's veracity required the 
exclusion of the evidence. 
The third factor, that of the similarity of the prior crime to the charged crime, also 
weighs in favor of the exclusion of the evidence of Appellant's prior conviction. In 
footnote 44 to the Banner case the Court referred to an earlier case, Terry v. ZCMI, 605 
P.2d 314, at 325 wherein the Court stated: 
"Consideration of the testimony's prejudicial 
effect is especially pertinent when the 
witness is the defendant in a criminal prose-
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cution ... This is particularly important when, 
as here, the prior conviction is for the same 
type of crime involved in the matter under 
present consideration. In this type of situation, 
the probative value of the evidence as affecting 
the party's credibility will rarely outweigh the 
resulting confusion of the issues in dispute and 
the prejudice to the party." 
A consideration of the fourth and fifth factors also demonstrate that the prior 
conviction should not have been received. The decisive issues in this case did not turn 
upon whether the defendant struck Mr. Dickerson with the pipe. Rather they involved 
issues of who was the aggressor and the defendant's claims of self defense. The transcript 
reveals that only three people witnessed in any fashion the blow received by Mr. 
Dickerson as it was delivered, Mr. Dickerson, the Appellant, and Dennis Gray. Mr. 
Dickerson testified that he tried to grab the metal bar to prevent the defendant from 
striking Mr. Murdock who had turned and was walking away from their location. He also 
testified that he did not make any aggressive moves toward the Appellant just prior to that 
blow being struck. Mr. Gray testified that just prior to the blow being struck that Mr. 
Dickerson ran up to Appellant in an aggressive manner. Appellant testified that he 
essentially acted to defend himself. Under those circumstances the introduction of 
evidence of a conviction of the same type of offense could serve no purpose other than to 
inflame the jury and as the third factor indicates," to punish the accused as a bad person." 
In reviewing this question the Court must determine whether the admission of the 
prior conviction was "harmless error." That determination is made by questioning 
whether there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant in the 
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absence of the error. State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032, 1032 (Utah 1987); State v. Knight, 
734 P.2d 913, 919-20 (Utah 1987); State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986). A 
reasonable likelihood exists "when the reviewing court's confidence in the outcome is 
eroded; this erosion occurs at some point between a "mere possibility" and a "probability" 
of a different outcome." State v. Knight 13A P.2d 913, 920; State v. Bruce 779 P.2d 646, 
(see dissenting opinion of Justice Zimmerman.) 
Appellant also asserts that in addition to the above errors involved in the admission 
of his prior conviction, that the offering of that evidence constituted prosecutorial 
misconduct. As the Supreme Court of Utah observed in State v. Emmett, Docket No. 
910077 (Utah 1992) "A prosecuting attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party 
to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as 
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal 
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he(she) 
is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is 
that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. (S)he may prosecute with earnestness and 
vigor—indeed, (s)he should do so. But, while (s)he may strike hard blows, (s)he is not at 
liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his (her) duty to refrain from improper methods 
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring 
about a just one." It is submitted that in view of all of the circumstances of this case, that 
the conduct of the prosecuting attorney introducing the prior conviction cannot be 
countenanced. It is a hollow exercise to speak out against such tactics and yet allow the 
17 
fruits of their use to stand because they are deemed to be "harmless." Until they are 
reviewed under a more stringent standard there is little, if any, reason for prosecutors to 
stop using such tactics. It is submitted that the conviction should be reversed and the 
case remanded with instructions that the prior convictions not be admitted and the 
prosecuting attorney sanctioned for offering the evidence before the evidentiary findings 
for its use required by Rule 609 had been made by the trial judge. 
Ill 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THE JURIES VERDICT 
Appellant contends, as his final point, that the evidence was insufficient to support 
the verdict against him. In reviewing a verdict on this ground the court's power is 
somewhat limited. The Court views the evidence along with the reasonable inferences 
from it in the light most favorable to the verdict. The court will reverse on the evidence 
so viewed, is so inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was 
convicted. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191-192 (Utah 1987); State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 
444 (Utah 1983); State v. Moore 802 P.2d 732 (Utah App. 1990). Appellant asserts that 
given the state of the record in this case, including the size and age differential between 
appellant and the alleged victim, the fact that appellant was obviously attempting to 
retreat from a highly emotionally charged confrontation, and the victims observed 
aggressive behavior toward appellant, that reasonable minds must have concluded that 
appellant reasonably believed that he needed to use the force he used to protect himself 
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from an attack by a much younger, larger, and stronger man. Under these circumstances, 
appellant should not be put in the position of risking a serious beating at the hands of 
such an individual or being charged and convicted of this kind of an offense. In view of 
the size and age differences appellant asserts that he would have been foolish indeed to 
have attempted to defend himself from such advances with his bare hands only. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, appellant urges upon this court that he did not receive a fair trial in 
view of all the circumstances of this case. His trial counsel did not adequately investigate 
or prepare his defense. He did not even adequately prepare Appellant for his testimony. 
He did not object when the prosecuting attorney offered evidence of Appellants prior 
felony conviction of a similar charge. As the United States Supreme Court noted in 
Holloway v. Arkansas 435 U.S. 475, 489, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 1181 (1978) the right to 
effective assistance of counsel is "so basic that its infraction can never be treated as 
harmless error." For this reason alone, the conviction should be reversed and a new trial 
ordered for Appellant. But this is not the only error that was made. The introduction of 
the prior conviction under the circumstances of this case was so prejudicial as to deny 
Appellant a fair trial. The prosecuting attorney took advantage of Appellant's trial 
counsels inept performance. There was absolutely no finding by the trial court that the 
probative value of that prior conviction outweighed its prejudicial effect to appellant. In 
view of the nature of that conviction and its remoteness in time, it had little, if any, 
bearing on Appellant's veracity and could serve no legitimate purpose other than to 
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prejudice the jury against Appellant. When coupled with the preparation and performance 
of Appellant's trial counsel the outcome was that Appellant did not receive a fair trial. 
Finally, Appellant asserts that under the facts, even as meagerly as they were 
developed in this case, that the evidence established that Appellant was justified in using 
the force that he used in this case. He repelled what appeared to him to be an imminent 
attack by a much younger, larger, and stronger man rather than submit himself to a 
beating which he could not repel with his bare hands only. 
It is Appellants request that the Court reverse the judgment of conviction entered 
against him and return this matter to the trial court with instructions to enter a judgment 
of not guilty or in the alternative that the Court reverse the judgment entered against 
Appellant and remand the matter for a new trial where Appellant can be assisted by 
effective counsel and present the witnesses he has to corroborate his testimony and where 
the prejudicial evidence erroneously admitted in this case can be properly excluded. 
DATED: March^ , 1993 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
RASMUSSEN AND GREEN 
foi/Appellant Attorney's 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-k-k-k-k-k-k-k-k-k-k-k 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THOMAS WESLEY CALLAHAN, 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER: 921400363 
DATE: OCTOBER 19, 1992 
RAY M. HARDING, JUDGE 
Rept: Creed Barker, CSR 
kkk-kkkkkkkkk 
This matter came before the Court for a sentencing 
hearing. The State appeared by and through Deputy County Attorney 
Claudia Laycock. The defendant was present and represented by 
Craig Bainum. 
Mr. Bainum addressed the Court in behalf of the 
defendant. The State responded. 
The defendant having been found Guilty by a jury to the 
offense of Aggravated Assault, a Third Degree Felony, now present 
in court and represented by counsel, and there being no legal 
reason why sentence should not be imposed, is hereby sentenced as 
follows: 
SENTENCE 
The defendant is sentenced to be confined in the Utah 
State Prison for an indeterminate term not to exceed five (5) 
years. 
CUSTODY REMAND 
The defendant is remanded to the custody of the Utah 
County Jail to be transported to the Department of Corrections to 
commence serving the sentence immediately. 
RECOMMENDATION 
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 77-27-13(5) the Court 
provides the following information: 
(1) The Court is of the opinion that the defendant 
should be imprisoned for a term prescribed by the Utah Sentence and 
Release Guidelines. 
(2) The Court has no information regarding the character 
of the defendant or any mitigating or aggravating circumstance 
connected with the offense for which the defendant was convicted 
other than those set forth in the Adult Probation & Parole report. 
(3) For the defendant to receive credit for the time 
already served for this case. 
(4) As a condition of parole, the defendant is to pay 
restitution in the amount of $89. 
cc: Carlyle K. Bryson, Esq. 
Craig Bainum, Esq. 
Adult Probation & Parole 
Utah County Jail 
Utah State Prison 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
*********** 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
CASE NUMBER: 921400368 
vs. 
THOMAS WESLEY CALAHAN, JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Defendant. 
************ 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1 
It is the duty of the court to instruct you in the law that 
applies to this case, and it is your duty as jurors to follow the 
law as the court states it to you, regardless of what you 
personally believe the law is or ought to be. On the other hand, 
it is your exclusive province to determine the facts in the case, 
and to consider and weigh the evidence for that purpose. 
The authority thus vested in you is not an arbitrary power, 
but must be exercised with sincere judgment, sound 
discretion, and in accordance with rules of law stated to you. 
INSTRUCTION NO, 2 
This is a criminal action brought by the State of Utah 
against defendant, Thomas Calahan, in which defendant is accused 
by the Information of the commission of the crime of: 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of 7 6-5-
103 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that he on or about 
August 4, 1992, in Utah County, Utah, did knowingly and 
intentionally or recklessly attempt, with unlawful force or 
violence to do bodily injury to another by use of a dangerous 
weapon, to wit: a metal bar; or did knowingly and intentionally 
or recklessly, threaten, accompanied by a show of immediate force 
or violence, to do bodily injury to another by use of a dangerous 
weapon, a metal bar; or did knowingly and intentionally or 
recklessly commit an act with unlawful force or violence that 
caused or created a substantial risk of bodily injury to another 
by use of a dangerous weapon, a metal bar. 
When the defendant was arraigned on this charge defendant 
entered a plea of not guilty, which plea casts upon the State the 
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the essential 
elements of the crime charge, which are set forth in Instruction 
No. 3 . 
The foregoing is not to be regarded as a statement of the 
facts proved in this case, but it is to be considered merely as a 
summarized statement of the accusation against defendant. 
INSTRUCTION NO, 3 
The essential elements of the crime charged in the 
Information, Aggravated Assault, a Third Degree Felony, are as 
follows: 
1. That the defendant, Thomas Calahan, on or about August 
4, 1992, in Utah County, Utah; 
2. Assaulted Steven Dickerson in that he intentionally, 
knowingly, or recklessly either: 
(a) attempted, with unlawful force or violence, to do 
bodily injury to Steven Dickerson; OR 
(b) threatened, accompanied by a show of immediate 
force or violence, to do bodily injury to Steven 
Dickerson; OR 
(c) committed an act, with unlawful force or violence, 
that caused or created a substantial risk of 
bodily injury to Steven Dickerson; 
3. That in committing an assault as defined above, the 
defendant either: 
(a) intentionally caused serious bodily injury to 
Steven Dickerson; OR 
(b) used a dangerous weapon or other means or force 
likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
If the State has failed to prove to your satisfaction beyond 
a reasonable doubt any one or more of the above essential 
elements of the crime charged, you must find the defendant not 
guilty of the crime charged. On the other hand, if the State has 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt all of the essential elements of 
the offense as above set forth, then you should find the 
defendant guilty of the charge. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 4 
A person engages in conduct intentionally with respect to 
the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it 
is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or 
cause the result. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 5 
Intent and motive should never be confused. Motive is what 
prompts a person to act, or fail to act. Intent refers only to 
the state of mind with which the act is done or omitted. 
Motive is not an element of any offense, and hence need not 
be proven. The motive of the accused is immaterial except 
insofar as evidence of motive may aid in a determination of state 
of mind or intent. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 6 
A person engages in conduct knowingly with respect to 
his conduct or to circumstance surrounding his conduct when he is 
aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing circumstances. 
A person acts knowingly with respect to a result of his conduct 
when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause 
the result. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 7 
You are instructed that a person engages in conduct 
recklessly, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct 
or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously 
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist or that the result will occur. The risk must 
be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a 
gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person 
would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the 
actor's standpoint. 
INSTRUCTION No. 8 
You are instructed that "bodily injury" means physical pain, 
illness, or any impairment of physical condition. 
INSTRUCTION No. 9 
"Serious bodily injury" means any bodily injury which 
creates or causes serious permanent disfigurement, protracted 
loss or impairment of a function of any bodily member or organ, 
or creates a substantial risk of death. 
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INSTRUCTION NO, 11 
The crime of Assault, a Class B Misdemeanor, is a lesser 
included offense to the crime of Aggravated Assault, a Third 
Degree Felony. In considering the offense it is your duty to 
first determine from the evidence in this case whether or not the 
Defendant is guilty of the crime charged in the information, 
Aggravated Assault, a Third Degree Felony. If you are convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of 
Aggravated Assault then you should so find and disregard the 
lesser included offense of Assault. 
If you determine that the Defendant did not commit, the crime 
charged in the information, then you shall consider whether or 
not he committed the lesser included offense of Assault. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 13 
A person is justified in threatening or using force against 
another when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that 
such force is necessary to defend himself or a third person 
against such other's imminent use of unlawful force; however, a 
person is justified in using force which is intended or likely to 
cause death or serious bodily injury only if he reasonably 
believes that the force is necessary to prevent death or serious 
bodily injury to himself or a third person, or to prevent the 
commission of a forcible felony. 
A person is not justified in using force under the 
circumstances specified in the preceding paragraph if he: 
a. initially provokes the use of force against himself with 
the intent to use force as an excuse to inflict bodily harm on 
the assailant; or 
b. is attempting to commit, committing, or fleeing after 
the commission or attempted commission of a felony; or 
c. was the aggressor or was engaged in a combat by 
agreement, unless he withdraws from the encounter and effectively 
communicates to such other person his intent to do so and the 
other notwithstanding continues or threatens to continue the use 
of unlawful force. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 14 
and has oeen neid *.^  ii.owLi u . e ^ * . I y 
"^id^rr.. v h q au i 11 an*- inference DT presumption adverse zo 
.'dui-ic id I i i iso fact M . 
INSTRUCTION NO. 15 
The defendant is not required to testify in his own 
behalf. The law expressly gives him the privilege of not 
testifying if he so desires. The fact that he has not taken the 
witness stand must not be taken as any indication of his guilt, 
nor should you indulge in any presumption or inference adverse to 
him by reason thereof. The burden remains with the state, 
regardless of whether the defendant testifies in his own behalf 
or not, to prove by the evidence his guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
^ e / i a . r , i f te f a c t t h a t a j e n e n a a n t i s , n d i g « - i W L L . C;H= 
• — ; - o "M-.-1 * . -t
 e ^eaar led r ;ou is rendinu > 
.apeaer, iiscre-:. 
.eiqhinq s a c ! endar . t . ., t e s t imcv iv , - i* -ay : :K-~ ^ T , O 
~ t~ * r* '-^ s * ' v *) ,*'*> ** ^ +~ t* ° *"* ^ n d *'T ' -' e 
s u c h t e s t i m o n y t h e sann. . i . . u... . . i r : ^ . : . ;•., 
o b l i g e d t o g i !/e t - _L__ _ . :u L V i i e n c u :; " h ^ a s e . 
INSTRUCTION NO. 17 
Evidence consists of testimony of witnesses, writings, 
material objects, or anything presented to the senses amd offered 
to prove the existence or nonexistence of a fact. 
Evidence is either direct or circumstantial. 
Direct evidence is evidence that directly proves a 
fact, without the necessity of an inference, and which by itself, 
if found to be true, establishes that fact. 
Circumstantial evidence is evidence that, if found to 
be true, proves a fact from which an inference of the existence 
of another fact may be drawn. And it is a deduction of fact that 
may logically and reasonably be drawn from another fact or group 
of facts established by the evidence. 
It is not necessary that facts be proved by direct 
evidence. They may be proved also by circumstantial evidence or 
by a combination of direct evidence and circumstantial evidence. 
Both direct evidence and circumstantial evidence are acceptable 
as a means of proof. Neither is entitled to any greater weight 
than the other. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 19 
If the Court has said or done anything which has suggested 
to you that it is inclined to favor the claims or positions of 
either party, you will not permit yourself to be influenced by 
such a suggestion. Do not assume that I hold any opinion on the 
matters to which I have addressed any comment, remark or inquiry. 
Neither in these instructions nor in any ruling, action, or 
remark that I have made during the course of this trial have I 
intended to interpose any opinion or suggestion as to how I would 
resolve any of the factual issues of this case. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 21 
The term "reasonable doubt" means doubt based on reason and 
common sense; it is doubt for which a reason can be given based 
upon the evidence. 
A "reasonable doubt" must be a doubt which, without being 
sought after, fairly and naturally arises from all the evidence 
or lack of evidence. A "reasonable doubt:" is a doubt which is 
real, and which does not arise from sympathy or from one's 
imagination. 
If after impartial consideration and comparison of all the 
evidence in the case you can honestly say that you are not 
convinced of the defendant's guilt, you have a reasonable doubt. 
If on the other hand after consideration and comparison of all 
the evidence in the case you can honestly say that you are firmly 
convinced of the defendant's guilt, the defendant's guilt has 
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt does not require proof to an absolute certainty. 
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INSTRUCTION NO, 23 
You are the sole judges of the weight of the evidence, the 
credibility of the witnesses and the facts. In considering the 
testimony of a witness you may consider his appearance and 
demeanor, his apparent frankness and candor, or the want of it; 
his opportunity to observe, his ability to understand, and his 
capacity to remember; you may consider the interest, if any is 
shown, which any witness may have in the result of the trial; and 
also any bias he or she may have, or any motive or probable 
motive which any witness may have to testify for or against 
either party. 
If you believe any witness has willfully testified falsely, 
as to any material fact in the case, you are at liberty to 
disregard the whole of the testimony of such witness, except for 
portions of the testimony that may have been corroborated by 
other credible witnesses or credible evidence. You are not bound 
to believe all that the witnesses may have testified to nor are 
you bound to believe any witness; you may believe one witness 
against many, or many as against one. In the light of the above 
observations, it is your privilege to judge the weight to be 
given the testimony of the witnesses and to determine what the 
facts are. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 25 
The attitude and conduct of jurors at the outset of their 
deliberations are a matter of considerable importance. It is 
rarely productive of good for a juror, upon entering the jury 
room, to make an emphatic expression of opinion on the case or to 
announce a determination to stand for a certain verdict. When 
one does that at the outset, one's sense of pride may be aroused, 
and one may hesitate to recede from an announced position if 
shown that it is fallacious. Remember that you are not partisans 
or advocates in this matter, but are judges. The final test of 
the quality of your service will lie in the verdict which you 
return to the court, not in the opinions any of you may hold as 
you retire to deliberate. Have in mind that you will make a 
definite contribution to efficient judicial administration if you 
arrive at a just and proper verdict. To that end, the court 
would remind you that in your deliberations in the jury room 
there can be no triumph excepting the ascertainment and 
declaration of the truth and the administration of justice based 
thereon. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 27 
In arriving at a verdict in this case, you shall not discuss 
nor consider the subject of penalty or punishment, as that is a 
matter which lies with the court, and other court proceedings. 
The penalty and punishment for the crime charged must not in any 
way affect your decision as to the guilt or innocence of the 
defendant. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 28 
When you retire to deliberate, you will select one of your 
members as foreperson, who will preside over your deliberations. 
Your verdict must be in writing, signed by your foreperson, and 
when found must be returned by you into this Court. 
I will provide you with four blank verdict forms. When you 
have agreed upon your verdict, your foreperson should sign the 
appropriate verdict form or forms and notify the officer having 
you in charge, who will conduct you into Court. 
This being a criminal case, a unanimous concurrence of all 
jurors is required to find a verdict. 
As to the charge of Aggravated Assault your verdict must be 
either: 
(A) Guilty of Aggravated Assault as contained in the 
Information, or 
(B) Not Guilty of Aggravated Assault. 
If you find the Defendant guilty of Aggravated Assault you 
should not consider the lesser included offense and may therefore 
disregard the verdict forms that correspond to the lesser 
included offense. 
If you find the Defendant not guilty of Aggravated Assault, 
you must return the appropriate not guilty verdict form, signed 
by your foreman, to the Court. You must then also consider the 
lesser included offense of Assault. As to the lesser included 
offense of Assault, your verdict must be either: 
(A) Guilty of Assault, or 
(B) Not Guilty of Assault. 
If you find the Defendant guilty of Assault, you should 
return a signed copy of the guilty verdict form corresponding to 
Assault, together with the not guilty verdict form corresponding 
to the Aggravated Assault charge, to the court. Similarly, if 
you find the Defendant not guilty of Assault, you should return a 
signed copy of the not guilty verdict form corresponding to 
Assault, together with the not guilty verdict form corresponding 
to the Aggravated Assault charge, to the court. 
You may take these instructions with you to the jury room 
for further consideration. 
Instructions numbered from 1 through 19 given to the Jury 
this 4th day of February, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
Ray M. Harding Judge 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
*********** 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
CASE NUMBER: 921400368 
vs. 
THOMAS WESLEY CALAHAN, JURY VERDICT 
Defendant. 
************ 
We, the Jury impaneled in the above entitled cause, find the 
defendant NOT GUILTY of Aggravated Assault, a Third Degree 
Felony. 
DATED this 14th day of September, 1992. 
Jury Foreperson 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
*********** 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
CASE NUMBER: 921400368 
vs. 
THOMAS WESLEY CALAHAN, JURY VERDICT 
Defendant. 
************ 
We, the Jury impaneled in the above entitled cause, find the 
defendant GUILTY of Aggravated Assault, a Third Degree Felony. 
DATED this 14th day of September, 1992. 
Jury Foreperson 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
*********** 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
CASE NUMBER: 921400368 
vs. 
THOMAS WESLEY CALAHAN, JURY VERDICT 
Defendant. 
************ 
We, the Jury impaneled in the above entitled cause, find the 
defendant NOT GUILTY of Assault, a Class B Misdemeanor. 
DATED this 14th day of September, 1992. 
Jury Foreperson 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * • * * * * * * ' * * 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THOMAS WESLEY CALAHAN, 
Defendant. 
CASE NUMBER: 921400368 
JURY VERDICT 
-k-k-k-k-k-k-kJc-k-kJelc 
We, the Jury impaneled in the above entitled cause, find the 
defendant GUILTY of Assault, a Class B Misdemeanor. 
DATED this 14th day of September, 1992. 
Jury Foreperson 
